It is common for central (national or provincial) 
Introduction
Community-level targeting of social programs is now popular in both developed and developing countries. The center delegates the task of choosing program beneficiaries to local (governmental or non-governmental) organizations. Proponents of such decentralized targeting have claimed that more information is available about who is poor at local level than to the center, and that local institutions tend to be more accountable to local people, and hence have an incentive to use the locally available information to improve program performance.
While the claim that more information is available locally seems plausible, and there is some supportive evidence (Alderman, 1998) , the claim that local institutions are accountable to the poor is more contentious. The accountability argument is persuasive in settings in which there is little or no distributional conflict at local level; Seabright (1996) develops the accountability argument for decentralization in the context of a model of locally homogeneous communities.
2 This is often assumed to be the case in developed countries with seemingly low costs of inter-jurisdictional mobility. 3 However, the assumption of homogeneous local communities (and of free mobility) is implausible in many settings in which decentralization has been popular, including underdeveloped rural economies. 4 When local communities are not homogeneous, decentralized social programs may well be captured by local elites. When (as is often the case) these programs provide a private (excludable) good, and there is no self-targeting mechanism to assure that only the poor want to participate, there would appear to be ample scope for such miss-targeting. Thus one can posit 2 It should be noted that this argument for decentralization is conceptually distinct from the classic arguments in public finance for decentralization based on efficiency gains from accommodating diverse preferences (as in Oates, 1972) . 3 Though distributional conflicts arising from local heterogeneity can be expected even in developed country settings with relatively free mobility between local jurisdictions (Ravallion, 1984) . 4 The existence of strong and persistent geographic effects in living standards in developing countries, controlling for observable household characteristics, warns against assuming free mobility. a trade off between the informational advantage of community-based targeting, and an accountability disadvantage. The theoretical case for decentralization will then depend critically on the extent of local program capture by the nonpoor, as demonstrated theoretically by Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998) . This is also likely to have implications for what actions the center may need to take to set the "rules of the game" for efficient and equitable local operation. 5 What does the available evidence suggest? There is anecdotal evidence of local program capture of decentralized antipoverty programs and development projects. A well known example in the same setting for our empirical work was provided by Hartmann and Boyce (1983) in their description of how rich local farmers in Bangladesh were able to capture a publicly provided (World Bank funded) local irrigation facility intended for poor farmers. More recently, Participatory Poverty Assessments by the World Bank in Bangladesh suggest that the rich in the community (the "matabbari") tend to dominate the local power structure; they tend to be the first, and possibly only, people consulted when a development program is undertaken in the community (un Nabi et al 1999) .
Such observations warn against assuming homogeneous local communities, and point to serious accountability concerns about the case for decentralizing the power to decide who gets help from an antipoverty program. However, the seriousness of that concern cannot be judged properly without more systematic evidence on the targeting performance of decentralized programs; hard evidence on these issues has been known to be scant for some time (Bardhan, 1996; Jimenez, 1999) . The enthusiasm for community-based targeting in policy circles has clearly run well ahead of the evidence.
For evidence on this point in the same setting as the empirical work in this paper see Ravallion and Wodon (1999a) . 5 There have been central efforts to set institutional rules for containing the problem. Tendler (1997) describes how this was done for drought-relief operations in the state of Ceará in Brazil. Also, the relative success of decentralized government in the state of Karnataka in India is attributed to the effective system of democratic accountability by Crook and Manor (1994) . This paper aims to enhance understanding of the distributional outcomes of decentralized programs. We take the existence of decentralization as given, and focus on the factors influencing outcomes for the poor. By exploiting the fact that the empowerment of the poor is likely to vary from village to village in a developing country, we are able to test for possible impacts on the extent to which the poor benefit from a public antipoverty program.
The fact that the program is decentralized is crucial to our empirical method. In particular, by building the empirics on explicit, and a priori plausible, assumptions about information structures we are able to identify some key structural parameters. We carry some key implications of this theoretical model to new data on a specific social program, namely Bangladesh's Food-for-Education (FFE) program. This is one of the many school-enrollment subsidy programs now found in both developing and developed countries. The official aim of the program is to keep the children of poor rural families in school. Fixed food rations are distributed to selected households conditional on their schoolaged children attending at least 85% of classes. Participants receive the rations as long as they send their children to primary school. Over two million children participated in 1995-96 (13% of total primary school enrolment). There is evidence of significant gains in terms of school attendance with only modest foregone income through displaced child labor (Ravallion and Wodon, 1999b) . However, little is known about how well the program has reached the poor. Yes, there are gains from the program, but are they gains to the poor?
Armed with a rich data set at household and community level we study the targeting performance of this program. There are two stages of targeting. First economically backward areas are chosen by the center. Second, community groups-exploiting idiosyncratic local information-select participants within those areas. We address the following questions:
• How much of the program's performance in reaching poor families was due to the center's efforts at reaching poor communities versus the efforts of those communities to reach their own poor?
• What factors influenced the center's targeting of communities? How did these factors compare with the determinants of poverty across areas?
• What determined the distributional outcomes within communities? Were outcomes different in different villages and what might account for any differences?
We begin with our theoretical model of benefit incidence for a decentralized program.
Section 3 outlines properties of our measure of targeting performance and then goes on to describe our data for Bangladesh and present relevant descriptive results. Section 4 outlines our econometric methods for explaining distributional outcomes of the program. Our results are discussed in section 5 and section 6 concludes.
2.
A model of benefit incidence for a decentralized social program
Our model aims to capture in a simple way the arguments made in policy discussions of community-based targeting. Our empirical work will aim to test some key implications.
A poverty reduction program exists with a fixed aggregate budget. The program is run by a Project Office (PO) within the central (federal or provincial) government. The PO decides how to allocate the budget across "communities". People in each community decide how to allocate the PO's budget allocation between the "poor" and "nonpoor" within that community. We assume that the program does not generate spillover effects across communities, such as due to mobility between them. 6 Mobility-induced spillover effects can be ruled out by assuming that the community only makes allocations across long-standing members or that there are costs of moving. The PO does not observe how much is going to the poor in each area, and has imperfect information on other relevant local characteristics.
The local collective action problem
We assume that the allocation within each community is Pareto efficient, in that it is not possible to increase the welfare of the poor (nonpoor) through the program without making the nonpoor (poor) worse off. The smaller the local government area that has power to decide who gets the program, the more plausible this assumption becomes. It appears to be a defensible assumption in the context of the classic village society in a developing country where one finds quasi-cooperative behavior based on repeated interaction and shared knowledge accumulated over long periods of relatively stable cohabitation. 7 However, there are circumstances in which this assumption will not hold, notably when program capture by the nonpoor requires a wasteful form of corruption. The actual institutional arrangement could take many forms, and we leave this open -it might be a representative village leader or a community council, or other delegated non-governmental organizations.
As is well-known, Pareto efficiency in such a problem implies that there exist appropriate weights on the utilities of the poor and nonpoor such that the outcome of the collective decision making can be represented by the maximum of the weighted sum of utilities. A special case is the utilitarian, equal-weights, solution in which the allocation maximizes the sum of all utilities. On the implications of mobility of the poor for decentralized social programs see Brown and Oates (1987) and Wildasin (1991) . On how mobility might impact on the local political economy see Rose-Ackerman (1983). 7 The assumption also accords with experimental evidence suggesting that people often achieve efficient cooperative outcomes without binding contracts (Dawes and Thaler, 1988) .
While the efficiency assumption implies that Pareto weights exist, it does not throw any light on how those weights are determined.
9 They can be interpreted as the relative power of the poor versus the nonpoor. This will presumably depend on the characteristics of the poor and nonpoor (such as the extent to which the poor are literate) and local political and economic environment, including variables that influence the reservation utilities of each party, should no agreement be reached. We postulate that all the exogenous variables of the equal weights solution are potential factors influencing the weights appropriate to each community, and (hence) which of the infinitely many efficient allocations will be observed.
The "poor" and "nonpoor" within the i'th (i=1,..,n) community receive per capita . This is taken to vary with all the exogenous variables in the collective decision problem.
Thus the community decision can be characterized as maximizing:
In addition to satisfying the last equation, the solutions equate In this respect our model is similar to recent collective-action models of household decision making that postulate an exogenous "distribution function" that weights the utilities of household members; see, for example, Bourguignon and Chiappori (1994) and Browning and Chiappori (1998) 
The derived welfare maximum is then ) , , (
. The difference between optimal spending on the poor and the nonpoor is:
We call this the "targeting differential" (following Ravallion, 1999b) . A positive (negative) value of T indicates that the program is targeted to the poor (nonpoor).
It is readily verified that both p i G and n i G are strictly increasing in i G ; both the poor and the nonpoor will gain from a program expansion in this model. However, the effect of a change in H is ambiguous. For the purpose of this discussion (though it is not required for the empirics) consider the case in which λ is non-decreasing in H; the relative weight (on percapita utility) of each group is increasing in its size. On the one hand, higher H increases the power of the poor in the community's decision making. But, on the other hand, it increases the relative price of making transfers to the poor whenever they are already receiving more than the nonpoor on a per capita basis. A higher poverty rate will then entail a substitution effect away from the poor, working against their greater power in local decision making. The outcome depends on the balance of these two effects.
To characterize the various outcomes that are possible, one can differentiate the first order conditions with respect to both G and H and show that:
where the subscripts denote partial derivatives (and the i subscripts are dropped for notational brevity The effects of changes in X on the community's allocation between the poor and nonpoor are ambiguous. Consider any element of X that increases the marginal utility of making a higher allocation to the poor (i.e., it increases
Then it is evident that p i G will be strictly increasing in that variable, while n i G will be decreasing. However, an element of X that increases the marginal utility of a higher program allocation to both groups will have an ambiguous effect on the incidence of program spending.
In this model, differences in the relative power of the poor in village decision making can be crucial to understanding differences in distributional outcomes of program spending.
Consider, for example, an increase in income inequality between the nonpoor and the poor.
At given λ one expects a partially compensating pro-poor re-allocation of program spending (given diminishing marginal utility of income). However, this need not hold if the higher income inequality dissempowers the poor in terms of their command over publicly supplied goods.
10 Suppose that the income of the nonpoor increases leaving that of the poor unchanged. The marginal utility of transfers to nonpoor can be assumed to fall, while the marginal utility of a transfer to the poor will be unchanged (or possibly rise). This will tend to increase the equilibrium transfer to the poor. However, if the higher income for the nonpoor relative to the poor decreases the Pareto weight on the poor then the effect on the incidence of program spending is ambiguous. The necessary (and sufficient) condition for a higher income of the nonpoor to result in higher transfers to the poor is that
Our task in the empirical work will be to estimate (3.1) and (3.2). We will also investigate the determinants of how the budget is allocated across areas, so we now turn to a model of the center's problem.
The problem facing the center's Project Office
The PO sets the budget allocation between communities, taking account of their behavior. The center has its own weight on the poor 1 * > λ , which it believes to be higher than many of the local i λ 's. The PO does not, however, have the same information set available locally (which is why the center chose to decentralize the program in the first place). The PO has data supplied by the Central Statistics Office (CSO), represented by the
So the center does not know how the community organizations have agreed to allocate their disbursements between the poor and nonpoor. We can write ) , ( ) , (
where i η is a vector of random variables unobserved by the center but with known joint distribution.
The project office's allocations i G (for i=1,..,n) maximize: 10 Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999), for instance, characterize the effect of inequality on the relative weight of the income groups in a model of electoral competition, where the nonpoor are organized in a lobby and can make campaign contributions: higher inequality lowers the level of awareness of the poor, decreasing the level of their political participation.
subject to its aggregate budget:
where there are i N people in the i'th municipality, which is known with certainty. The center also takes account of the fact that p i G and n i G maximize (1) subject to (2). We apply the "first-order approach" whereby (3.1) and (3.2) are used to eliminate p i G and n i G from (6) (recalling that (3.1) and (3.2) are the i'th community's first-order conditions in explicit form).
In addition to (7), the center's first-order conditions require that:
is equalized across all i with the multiplier on the center's overall budget constraint, denoted µ . Sufficient conditions for this to give the unique global maximum are that:
for all i. 11 We can write the solutions in the form:
This can be thought of as the center's "payment schedule", giving its optimal outlays as a function of the available indicators at local level.
This model is too general to deliver unambiguous predictions about the comparative static properties of these solution functions. For example, suppose that H is known by the center and that the center does not attach any weight to the welfare of the nonpoor (
Note that (9) implies that (6) is strictly quasi-concave in ) ,..,
. Note also that (9) is not implied by concavity of utility functions, which implies that the first two terms in brackets are negative. However, the sign of the third term is ambiguous. A sufficient condition for the third term to be non-positive is that the marginal allocation to the poor does not rise as spending increases approaches infinity), so that the center aims to maximize the total transfer to the poor. Now compare the center's spending allocation between two areas with different values of H.
There is nothing to guarantee that the community with the higher H should get more from the center. For a program that is initially targeted to the poor (T>0), a center aiming to maximize the aggregate gains to the poor will take account of the fact that the communities in municipalities with higher poverty incidence will tend to make lower per-capita allocations to their poor. Whether this effect is strong enough for the center to make lower transfers to poorer municipalities remains an open question; the answer cannot be predicted from the assumptions so far (see Ravallion, 1999a , for further discussion in a similar model.)
On using (9) to eliminate i G from (3.1) and (3.2) we have the reduced form equations for the incidence of program spending:
Endogenous information
One possible extension to this model is worth elaborating further because it will help motivate our specification tests later.
In the above model, the CSO monitors a vector of exogenous indicators i Z directly for all i and the PO bases its allocation on that data. The exogeneity assumption can be questioned in at least two cases of potential relevance in this setting: Holmström, 1987) . The center will then want to take account of this effect in making its allocation across communities.
Case 2: Z might include data that the CSO asks each local authority to supply. This presumes that it is prohibitively costly for the CSO to obtain all its data directly; it has no choice but to rely on the information supplied locally. This creates scope for the data to be manipulated by the local authorities.
12 The center will then want to influence local incentives for providing good data. 
This assumption will help motivate our econometric methods for dealing with potentially endogenous data on local area characteristics when we come to try to explain the center's allocation across areas. In particular, the variables in i X that are unobserved by the center will be valid instruments for testing the endogeneity of some of the determinants of the center's allocation choices. To help motivate the assumption in (12), let us consider how it might be derived theoretically.
12
Past discussions of targeted antipoverty policies have acknowledged the existence of imperfect information, and the potential endogeneity of observed outcome indicators with respect to the program. However, it appears to have been assumed universally that the data are not manipulated. The fact that at least some of the data on which program decisions are based is supplied locally by potential beneficiaries, leads one to question this assumption. (12) is then interpreted as the solution.
In Case 2, of manipulated data, one can interpret (12) as the solution to a contract problem between local authorities and the CSO. For example, suppose that the CSO knows that the project office bases its allocations on both i Z 1 and i Z 2 . To help assure more accurate reporting, we can assume that the statistics office is able to impose a penalty on local authorities supplying the data. The penalty takes the form of reporting a likely offender to the PO, which then cuts that community out of the program with some probability. The PO announces that the i'th community will receive ) , (
where the function G is increasing in i Z 1 . The CSO reports likely offenders with probability
where the function ρ is decreasing in i Z 1 . So the local authority chooses i Z 1 to maximize:
We then assume an interior solution, which will take the form in (12).
Descriptive results

Measuring and decomposing targeting performance
The strength of association between poverty and program coverage is a natural indicator of the overall performance of an antipoverty program. To see how this can be formalized, it is useful to introduce some notation for the classification of recipients/nonrecipients as poor/nonpoor, as in Table 1 .
Each household who participates in the program receives a sum G. The targeting differential (T in equation 4) is the difference between the average amount going to the poor (n 11 G/n°1) and that going to the nonpoor (n 12 G/n°2). If T=0 it means that the poor and nonpoor receive the same per capita amount from the program. If T >0 the poor get more; T <0 they get less. When expressed as a ratio to G, we will refer to T/G as the "targeting coefficient":
This is the difference between the fraction of the poor who receive the program and the fraction of the nonpoor who do so. The targeting coefficient lies between -1 and +1. If the program is perfectly targeted to the poor (n 12 = n 21 =0) then T/G=1; if the program is perfectly targeted to the nonpoor (n 11 = n 22 =0) then T/G=-1; a uniform ("untargeted") allocation (n 11 /n°1=n 12 /n°2) implies that T/G=0.
The targeting coefficient is a measure of association for the 2x2 contingency table in Table 1 . It is related to the "phi coefficient", a common measure in statistics for association in a 2x2 contingency table, and here given by:
(The necessary and sufficient condition for T/G = φ is that (n 11 -n 22 )( n 12 -n 21 ) = 0.) The phi coefficient is related to the standard chi-square test statistic for the test of independence in a contingency 
within between communities communities where T is the overall targeting differential, T i is the targeting differential within village i, N is the overall number of households and N i is the number of households in village i.
The program under study
FFE is implemented in two stages. First, the participating Union Parishads (UP) are chosen; a UP is a local government area, of which there are about 4,500 in rural Bangladesh, each of which belongs to a "Thana" of which there are 490. 1,200 UP's were chosen to participate in the program, through a process that assured that all Thanas participated. 13 The stated aim is to select UP's that are 'economically backward' and with a low literacy rate.
The selection is done by the center in consultation with the Thana Education Committee and the minister in charge of coordination of development activities in that area of the country.
The center clearly controls the UP selection process, though there is scope for local lobbying to attract the program.
In the second stage, eligible households are identified within the selected UP's. observation unit in the community survey is the "mauza" which we will refer to as the "village". 16 This observation unit is geographically finer than the level at which geographic targeting is done (UP). We return to this point.
15
In particular, the Vulnerable Group Development and Rural Maintenance Program are government sponsored programs distributing food to the poor that are not compatible with the FFE program. The household questionnaire accounts only for household participation to the FFE program. The community questionnaire contains information on the presence of the Vulnerable Group Development (reported positive for 4% of the villages) and on other programs: there are only few villages in which the two sets of programs overlap, so that the extent of potential omitted bias when analyzing the intra-village targeting performance is relatively small.
16
The mauza is a compact area of around 250 households, forming a single natural village in about 80% of the cases; in the other cases the will contain two or possible three natural villages.
The program reaches 25% of the villages in the sample. The percentage of households participating in the program is 9.8% for the whole sample, and 40% within the participating villages. The poor are defined as those in the poorest half of the national per-capita expenditure distribution for rural areas. This accords reasonably well with both official and independent estimates of the poverty rate in rural Bangladesh (World Bank, 1998) .
3.3
Measures of overall targeting performance We repeated these calculations for two lower poverty lines, namely poverty rates of 25% and 36%. The same basic pattern was found.
So these calculations immediately contradict the supposed trade off between the informational advantage and accountability disadvantage of community-based targeting. The center does not appear to be more pro-poor than the villages, though (as a whole) the villages are not particularly pro-poor.
One reason for poor village selection is built into the program design, whereby all districts participate. Naturally this constrains the scope for geographic targeting. The requirement that all districts participate appears to be political-economy constraint, whereby a broad geographic spread of participants is deemed politically desirable. This is not uncommon in social programs.
17
Performance is, however, heterogeneous across communities. The targeting coefficient (calculated at the community level) is positive for two thirds of the selected villages, and negative for the rest. A preliminary description of the variation across communities can be obtained non-parametrically by looking at how incidence varies according to observed structural parameters. As can be seen from Figure 1 , both the poor and the nonpoor benefit from an increase in the budget allocated to the community, consistently with our theoretical model of the community's behavior. An increase in the poverty incidence reduces the allocation to the nonpoor (Figure 2a ), but has an ambiguous effect on the allocation to the poor. (There are too few observations to estimate non-parametrically the responsiveness of The empirical analysis in the next section will try to identify some economic and social characteristics relevant to community decision-making, and those characteristics responsible for attracting resources from the center to the community.
Econometric methods
We first establish that there are strong village effects in individual program participation, and that these arise from differences in mean participation at village level.
Consider a random sample of households that have access to the program. The determinants of individual participation among the poor and nonpoor can be modeled as: respectively, for household h in village i and a vector of observed household characteristics, X. We allow for village fixed effects n i p i µ µ , in (17.1) and (17.2); these control fully for any community characteristics that may influence household participation and any geographically correlated but omitted household characteristics.
Significant village effects in (17.1) and (17.2) could arise from inter-village differences in average program incidence. However, there might also be village effects on individual allocations (controlling for X) due to unobserved geographically-correlated household characteristics that influence program incidence. To test this, we run the regressions using instead the deviations from mean participation at the village level: There are strong and significant village effects in household participation among the poor and the nonpoor in (17.1-17.2). Table 4 gives our estimates of equations (17.1) and (17.2), as well as a pooled model (imposing identical parameters for the poor and nonpoor).
Both the household characteristics and village effects are significant in all cases. Families with primary-school aged children are more likely to participate, though this effect is only significant amongst the nonpoor. Female headed households and those with poorly educated adult women are more likely to receive the program, and this effect is found amongst the poor rather than nonpoor. Among nonpoor households, those with little land are more likely to obtain access to the program. Poorer households (in terms of expenditure per person) are also more likely to get the program. However, this effect is not found amongst the poor, but is due to targeting of the less well off amongst the nonpoor.
While the village effects are significant in the estimates of (17.1) and (17.2), we find that they disappear in the deviations of household participation from the village mean participation, using the specification in (17.3) and (17.4). The village effects in individual participation arise from inter-village differences in mean participation rates.
Motivated by these preliminary results, we now focus on the decision process at the village level on how to allocate the program between the poor and nonpoor.
Modeling the intra-village allocations
Consider each community's optimal allocation between the poor and nonpoor. The empirical counterparts of (3.1) and (3.2) for the i'th participating village are:
where n p i X , are the mean characteristics of the poor and nonpoor (though these may of course be the same, such as for a village-wide characteristic). Note that the regressions mirror the 'structural' solution of the local authorities problem: they are both conditional on G i , the amount of the total budget allocated to the local area. We allow the error terms to be
) since the allocations between the poor and the nonpoor are collectively determined by the local community, and are therefore affected by the same set of 18 The dependent variable is an indicator of household participation in the FFE program (=1 if participates). The linear probability model is preferred to the probit for consistency with latter unobservables. So these equations are jointly estimated as Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). In keeping with our theoretical model, we assume that the center's allocation is exogenous (both We will however provide a test for exogeneity of G i .
The results on intra-community targeting are presented in Table 5 . The 'eligibility variables' refer to the criteria officially used for targeting within the village. For each income group, we use the proportion of households in the village that are landless, 19 female headed and widows or in low occupational professions. In addition, the average number of children aged 6-15 for each household in the village measures the population of children of primary school age that are the prospective FFE recipients.
The set of 'structural variables' in Table 5 aims to measure the level of 'economic backwardness' of the village. They include indicators for agricultural development and the extent of diversification in non-farm activities, the illiteracy rate of the adult population, the number of schools in the community and its population density. The access to credit is measured by the presence of the Grameen Bank (a well known group-based credit program providing production credit to the poor) and of the Krishi Bank (a state-owned agricultural bank, specialized agricultural lending). An indicator for whether the village was hit by a shock in the previous year is also included. 20 A group of variables indicate the degree of openness/isolation of the village with possible implications for the bargaining power of the estimates. The results are however robust to this alternative specification.
19
A household is landless (or near landless) if its land holdings are below 0.5 acres.
20
Shocks encompass natural disasters (flood, drought, river erosion, cyclone), epidemic diseases, pest attack and poultry plague. Note that both the shock indicators and the number of poor in community decision making: those variables comprise electrification, presence of a telephone, road quality, and distance to the Thana headquarters and to the capital, Dhaka. We also use a measure of existing indicators of informal net transfers to the poor within the village. Again, two arguments can be made as to why this might matter. On the one hand, the pressure to target the poor using FFE transfers will be less if the poor are already being helped. However, on the other hand, a high level of transfers to the poor might reflect their power within the village. In view of the potential endogeneity concern here, schools are aggregated in the intra-village targeting regressions, in order to limit the number of regressors with a small sample size.
21
The results are robust to alternative measures of land inequality; we tried the Gini index and the coefficient of variation. The Wolfson index is not strictly a measure of inequality but rather of the extent of "polarization", interpretable as how bi-modal the distribution is between "poor" and "nonpoor" (Wolfson 1994 ). More precisely, the index is defined as W≡2(µ*-µ L )/m, where µ* is the actual mean of PCE times 1 -Gini index, µ L is the mean PCE for the poorest 50% of the population and m is the median PCE.
rather than the level of transfers we shall use a dummy variable taking the value one if net transfers to the poor are positive on average.
We forgo discussion of the results until section 5.
Modeling the center's allocation across villages
In modeling the center's allocation we want to test for manipulation of information flowing from the community to the center as discussed in section 3.3. The information set available to the center, i Z , is partitioned as ) , (
are potentially endogenous while i Z 2 (a subset of i X ) is a vector of exogenous variables. The model is:
We allow the possibility that the set of eligibility criteria (the adult illiteracy rate, landlessness and occupation of the head in certain categories) are manipulated when transmitted by the community to the center.
The simultaneous equation system (19) is estimated in a Limited Information
Maximum Likelihood (LIML) framework for limited dependent variables, following Smith and Blundell (1986) . We compare the results to a Tobit in which endogeneity is ignored. Again, the information structure at the heart of a decentralized setting provides us with the exclusion restrictions necessary to identify the system. In the case above, when the center's allocation to the community is potentially endogenous, variables in the private information set of the center are used as instruments.
Here conversely, the information transmitted by the local communities to the center is potentially endogenous. Variables like the degree of inequality/polarization and the presence of informal net transfers within the village flow to the poor (or reliable indicators of these) are presumably common knowledge within the village, but are not part of the information set used by the center when deciding how to allocate the budget across communities. The set of variables deemed to be idiosyncratic to the local community ) ( P i X provides the instruments.
Testing exogeneity of the center's budget allocations at village level
Our theoretical model, and the regressions based on (18), assume that the center's budget allocation is taken as given at village level i.e., that G i is uncorrelated with p i ξ and/or n i ξ in (18). This would not hold, and our estimates would be biased, if (for example) the center was able to observe some variable that influences a village's propensity to reach the poor but which is not data available to us.
To address this concern, we test whether our estimated residuals from (19.1) are significant when we add them to our regressions based on (18). For identification we rely on the decentralized nature of the program and the information structure of the agency problem.
The center officially targets villages with lower literacy rates, i.e., the PO ranks the villages and selects one village from each Thana. The ranking of villages by the center is used as an instrument. Here we assume that villages know the cardinal value of their own literacy rate but not that of competing villages. The ranking affects the allocations to the poor/nonpoor only through its effect on the budget transferred to the area. An indicator of whether the illiteracy rate of the village is higher than the corresponding regional average is used as a ranking indicator.
Discussion of the results
Targeting the poor within villages
We saw in Table 4 that the program tends to reach relatively poor segments of the community. Eligible households that are female headed, near landless and have children in the primary school age range are more likely to be selected into the program. Among the nonpoor, relatively less educated parents and households with lower resources (measured by the log of expenditure per member) benefit relatively more from the FFE. However, selfemployment has a negative (positive) effect on the participation of the poor (nonpoor): it is not included in the official eligibility criteria and is a good predictor of the leakage to the nonpoor.
The results in Table 4 also allow us to reject the null hypothesis of village effects in the deviations of household incidence from village mean incidence. How then are the village characteristics affecting the allocation within the village between the poor and the nonpoor?
The regressions in Table 5 confirm the bivariate associations in Figure 1 , indicating that allocations to the poor and the nonpoor increase significantly with an increase in the amount transferred from the center G i , consistently with the theoretical predictions of our model of efficient intra-village allocation. Our exogeneity tests are reported in the second main column of Table 5 . When we add the residuals from the first stage Tobits for G to the regressions in Table 5 , the t-tests do not reject the null that the center's budget allocation is exogenous at village level. Other coefficients and their standard errors changed little by treating G i as endogenous.
Among the eligibility criteria, a household whose head is employed as an agricultural worker or in a low profession among the poor is more likely to receive the program. Female headed households are targeted relatively more among the nonpoor. The structural variables are jointly significant in the targeting differential, but not in the separate allocations to the two income groups. Indicators of degree of access to markets and ease of communication outside the village do not affect targeting performance.
Variables that appear likely to affect the relative power structure in community decision-making have explanatory power for benefit incidence. Higher income polarization within the village results in less pro-poor program incidence. All indicators of social capital are jointly significant predictors of the distribution of resources within the village. The presence of informal safety nets targeted to the poor appears to be a substitute for public expenditures: net transfers flowing to the poor in the community make it easier for the nonpoor to reap the benefits of the program. The role of the civil society in collective decision-making is indirectly captured by the presence of clubs and cooperatives in the village. The degree of local capture and leakage of the program increases with the relative bargaining power of the nonpoor, as indicated by the significant negative effect of the presence of a club in the community. Conversely, the targeting to the poor, and the share of transfers to the poor, improve when they are organized collectively in cooperatives. The effects of the social capital indicators are robust across different specifications.
Targeting villages
The results from the Tobit regression of the allocation of the FFE funds across communities are presented in Table 6 .
The center reaches poor areas in some respects: communities with low literacy rates, with a higher fraction of households in low professions, with low cropping intensity or hit by a shock (natural disaster/epidemic/pests) are more likely to be receiving the program. The center chooses and allocates more resources to areas where the Grameen Bank is operative.
There is evidence that Grameen Bank branch placement is responsive to potential gains to the poor (Ravallion and Wodon, 1999c) . However, the presence of the Krishi Bank reduces the amount of FFE program transferred to the village: it may be the two activities are perceived as substitutes and that the center uses the total budget to maximize geographical coverage.
There are other indicators operating in the opposite direction and these account for the negative targeting differential in the inter-village component obtained in section 3. The center does not target areas with relatively low literacy rates: the coefficient on the ranking of communities in the region is negative and significant in the budget allocation regression.
Moreover, areas with income diversification into off-farm activities and with better irrigation are receiving more transfers from the center, not less.
We are not able to reject the hypothesis of exogenous information; the residuals from the first stage predicted 'eligibility' criteria are not significant.
These results reflect to some extent the design features of the program, whereby it targets UP's, subject to the political constraint that every Thana participates. Finer geographic targeting (at village level rather than UP) and without the Thana participation constraint would undoubtedly improve performance.
Conclusions
By tapping into local information, it has often been argued that a suitably decentralized antipoverty program will be able to help the poor more than a centralized program; it is argued that the decentralized program will be better at targeting those in need.
Against this informational advantage, it is recognized that local communities need not share the center's objectives for the program, and may be less accountable to the poor. In attempting to understand distributional outcomes in this setting, our empirical analysis has been motivated by a model of Pareto-efficient community organizations dealing with a less well-informed central government that retains power over the inter-community allocation of spending, but has no ability to directly control distributional outcomes within communities.
Informed by this theoretical model and our descriptive findings, we have studied the performance of community-based targeting for Bangladesh's Food-for-Education Program.
To measure targeting performance, we have proposed a "targeting coefficient". This lies between minus one (when the program is perfectly targeted to the nonpoor) and plus one (when it is perfectly targeted to the poor), with a value of zero indicating that the poor and nonpoor are equally likely to get the program. We find that the program's transfers are targeted to the poor, in that a higher proportion of the poor receive help than do the nonpoor.
The difference is small, however; the estimated targeting coefficient is 0.02, though the association between program placement and poverty is statistically significant.
However, we find that this mildly pro-poor overall targeting performance was due entirely to pro-poor targeting within villages. The center's targeting of villages contributed nothing to overall targeting performance; this was due in part to the center's desire to assure broad geographic coverage of the program. So, contrary to expectations, local communities appear to be more accountable to the poor than the center. The trade off between information and accountability is not in evidence.
Targeting performance varied greatly between villages. We have tried to explore the local socio-economic determinants of the program's diverse distributional outcomes across villages. Here our main unit of observation has been the community rather than the individual. This is in keeping with the fact that we find very strong village effects in individual program participation for both the poor and nonpoor, but that we find that these effects vanish when one nets out the mean village-level participation of each income group.
We conclude that understanding collective decision making at village and central levels is the key to understanding outcomes at the individual level. We also find that taking account of the decentralized information structure in decision making affords opportunities for econometric identification.
We find that the proportion of the poor receiving the program increases as the program expands, but so does the proportion of the nonpoor benefiting from the program.
These findings are consistent with our theoretical model. On balance, we find that targeting performance is unaffected by changes in program size. While there is pro-poor targeting within villages, the program's official eligibility criteria turn out to be rather weak indicators of inter-village differences in performance. Nor is the extent of modernization a good indicator; in general, relatively developed villages don't seem to be any better at reaching their poor than backward villages, though more developed villages do appear to attract more support from the center, diminishing overall targeting performance.
However, our results do suggest that differences in the relative power of the poor in local decision making matter to the distributional outcomes of the program within villages.
For example, we find that village income distributions that are more polarized between poor and nonpoor tend to be associated with worse performance in targeting the poor through the program. This is not what one would expect to find with fixed Pareto weights; so we conclude that a larger income gap between the rich and the poor comes with a higher likelihood that the nonpoor will be able to capture the benefits of this antipoverty program.
There is no sign here of a self-correcting mechanism whereby community-based targeting allows the program to reach the poor better in highly unequal villages.
We also find some evidence that local social capital matters, though it is not necessarily pro-poor. The presence of cooperatives for farmers and the landless does appear to be associated with more pro-poor targeting of this program. However, the presence of recreational clubs-which probably reflect, and help build, the social capital of the nonpoor-has the opposite effect. (1) First stage regressions for landholdings, adult illiteracy and low profession are available upon request: they include, in addition to the regressors above, the interquantile range for land, the Wolfson polarization index and an indicator of net transfers to the poor in the community as instruments. The F -test (F(3,161)and p-values) for the significance of the instruments in the 1 st stage are 2.06 (0.107), 4.71 (0.003) and 2.74 (0.04) respectively.
